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This paper provides a new approach to analyzing credit constraints by differentiating 
which of the household’s production and consumption decisions are affected by credit 
constraints. It also provides a first attempt to estimate of the extent and determinants of credit 
constraints in the Philippines. Based on direct questions on households’ experiences in credit 
markets, we estimate the percentage of credit-constrained households at 65%. The lack of credit 
constrained the level of agricultural production of 37% of the farming households; it also 
constrained the level of family business production of 31% of the households operating such 
businesses. Credit constraints also limited consumption choices of 21% of the sample households. 
We found that the presence of credit programs operating in the village and proximity to 
commercial banks and rural banks reduced the probability of credit constraints in production 
decisions. Further, some types of households are more likely to experience credit constraints. 
These are the households with little education, households that own little or no titled land, and 
sugar-producing households.   
Keywords: Credit constraints, Philippines, Asia. 
 
 Ce papier propose une nouvelle approche des problèmes de contraintes de crédit en ce 
qu’il différencie quelles décisions de production ou de consommation du ménage sont affectées 
par les contraintes de crédit. Ce papier constitue également la première analyse de l’étendue et 
des déterminants des contraintes de crédit aux Philippines. A l’aide de questions sur l’expérience 
des ménages sur le marché du crédit, nous estimons le pourcentage de ménages contraints à 65%. 
Le manque de crédit contraignait ainsi les choix productifs agricoles de 37% des ménages 
agricoles de même qu’il contraignait 31% des choix productifs des ménages opérant une activité 
non agricole. Les contraintes de crédit affectaient également les choix de consommation de 21% 
des ménages enquêtés. Certains ménages sont plus exposés aux contraintes de crédit. Ce sont les 
ménages ayant un faible niveau de capital humain, les ménages possédant peu de terres avec titre 
de propriété et les ménages producteurs de canne à sucre. La présence de programmes de crédit 
opérant dans le village de même que la proximité de banques rurales ou commerciale permet de 
réduire les contraintes de crédit, tout du moins dans le domaine productif. 
Mots clefs : Contraintes de crédit, Philippines, Asie. 
 
JEL codes: O12, O16 
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1. Introduction 
The Philippine rural financial sector has undergone dramatic changes in the past 
quarter century. It has evolved from a supply-led finance approach in the 1970s and 
1980s characterized by loan targeting, credit subsidies and directed loans to certain 
sectors, to market-oriented financial and credit policy. Interest rate caps were lifted in the 
early 1980s, government banks and rural banks1 were restructured in 1986-1987, bank 
entry and branching was liberalized in the early 1990s, the Central Bank was restructured 
in 1993, foreign banks were allowed to enter the market in 1994, and the country’s 
largest bank, the Philippine National Bank, was privatized. However, the government 
was still heavily engaged in highly subsidized directed credit programs (DCPs) in the 
1990s with 21 government agencies implementing 86 such programs (Llanto, Geron and 
Tang, 1999). As detailed in Llanto (2001), the Filipino rural financial sector in the 1990s 
was characterized by the huge fiscal cost of unsustainable DCPs and low financial 
discipline among borrowers, a weakened rural banking system dependent on subsidized 
funds, and inefficient targeting. This situation led the government to phase out all DCPs 
by 2002 for both the agriculture sector and the non-agricultural sector2 and adopt a 
demand-driven approach to rural finance.3 Aside from providing financing opportunities, 
access to credit indeed stimulates productive investments and reduces the risk-
vulnerability of rural households that might be therefore more willing to adopt new 
technologies (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). The Medium-Term Philippine Development 
Plan (MTPDP) for 2001-2004 recognizes the importance of an efficient, sustainable and 
demand-driven rural financial market and emphasizes the importance of increasing access 
to credit, including long term financing of small farmers and indigenous peoples and 
promoting a savings-led approach to agricultural and small off farm business financing.  
 
                                                 
1 Between 1980 and 1987, the total volume of loans from formal institutions declined by 44% in real terms; 
three commercial banks, 147 rural banks and 32 thrift institutions failed (Cho and Khatkhate, 1990). 
2 The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) passed in 1997 is the legal basis for the 
withdrawal of the government from agricultural DCPs.  Its equivalent for the nonagricultural sector is 
Executive Order 138, passed in 1999. 
3 The Agricultural Modernization Credit and Financing Program (AMCFP) of 1997 specifies that all 
lending decisions and credit delivery should be made through banks and strong or viable cooperatives and 
NGOs, excluding the government or non-government non-financial institutions from that field. 
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How credit constrained are rural households after financial liberalization? 
Previous studies on rural financial markets in the Philippines have described its policy 
environment (e.g. Esguerra, 1996 and Adams, Chen and Lamberte, 1993), the nature of 
interlinkages with the credit market (Floro and Yotopopulos, 1991 and Nagarajan, David 
and Meyer, 1992), the demand for agricultural loans (Nagarajan, Meyer and Hushak, 
1998) and the role of credit market in mitigating shocks (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; 
Fafchamps and Gubert, 2002). Empirical studies on access to credit and credit constraints 
are still lacking for the Philippine rural sector. 
Thus, this paper aims to provide information on the extent of credit rationing and 
its determinants in the rural Philippines. We develop a method of elicitation of credit 
constraints based on the approach of Feder, Lau, Lin and Luo (1990) that allows us to 
differentiate which of the household’s decisions on consumption and agricultural and off-
farm production are affected by credit constraints. We use this information to develop 
models of the joint probability of being constrained across multiple activities, including 
agricultural production, a non-farm family business and consumption. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 3 reviews approaches 
that have been used in the literature to measure households’ access to credit and credit 
constraints. Section 3 develops our empirical model and section 4 describes the setting, 
sample and survey instruments. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical model 
while the final section concludes and discusses some policy implications. 
 
2. Identification of credit constraints in the literature 
Previous studies have found that the percentage of credit constrained households 
ranges from 19% to 72% as shown in Table 1. However, it is difficult to compare these 
estimates given the differences in the study samples and the methodologies used for 
eliciting credit-constrained status. The following of this section will thus review the 
different approaches to measure credit constraints. 
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Table 1 Prevalence of credit rationing 
 
 
Source Details of the survey and sample Definition of credit constraints Extent of credit constraints 
Bali Swain 
(2002) 
India, 1997, author's household 
survey, 761 farm households 
Probability of access to formal sector loans of 
households with positive credit demand and 
for which the formal sector is predicted to be 
preferred to the informal sector 
72% 
Barham, 
Boucher 
and Carter 
(1996) 
Guatemala, 1992, author's 
household survey, 201 producer 
households 
Percentage of households credit constrained in 
the formal sector (credit unions and banks). 
Households are classified as fully constrained 
if they applied and were rejected or if they did 
not apply because insufficient collateral, high 
transaction cost of the loan or because they 
feared loss of wealth. Households that 
received a smaller loan than what they 
requested or wanted are classified as partially 
constrained. 
34% of the households reported to 
be credit constrained by private 
banks. 28% of these bank-
constrained households were also 
fully constrained by the credit 
unions and 27% were partially 
constrained by the credit unions. 
Diagne, 
Zeller and 
Sharma 
(2000) 
Bangladesh, 1993-1995, IFPRI, 
Rural Finance and Food Security 
Survey (1994), 350 households; 
Malawi, 1993-1995, 
IFPRI/Bunda, Rural Finance 
Survey (1995), 404 households 
Households that had at least one of their 
members (members over 17 years old) facing 
a binding credit limit are classified as credit 
constrained. A household member has a 
binding credit limit if his perceived credit 
limit with a type of lender is null or equal to 
the amount borrowed from that type of lender.
55% and 61% of current members 
of credit programs experienced a 
binding informal or formal credit 
constraint in Bangladesh and 
Malawi respectively. 84% and 92% 
of households that have never been 
members of any credit program 
experienced a binding credit 
constraint in Bangladesh and 
Malawi respectively. 
Feder, 
Lau, Lin 
and Luo 
(1990) 
China, 1987, author's household 
survey, 187 agricultural 
households 
The borrowers that indicated a desire for more 
credit at the going interest rates or that did not 
borrow because they could not obtain credit 
were classified as credit constrained. 
37% 
Jappelli 
(1990) 
US, 1982, Survey of Consumer 
Finances (1983), 2971 
households 
Households are credit constrained if they 
report a positive answer to the following 
questions:  have they been turned down by a 
lender or have not been able to get as much 
credit as they applied for in the past few years 
and were not able to get the corresponding 
credit through another application. 
Households that thought they would apply for 
credit in the past few years but did not do so 
because they thought they might be turned 
down are also considered credit constrained. 
19% 
Kochar 
(1997) 
India, 1981-1982 All-India Debt 
and Investment Survey, 2415 
farm households 
Probability of access to formal sector loans of 
households with positive credit demand and 
for which the formal sector is predicted to be 
preferred to the informal sector. 
26% 
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There are three main approaches to measuring credit constraints in the literature. The first 
type is an indirect method that infers the presence of credit constraints based on 
predictions from theory, such as the violation of the permanent income hypothesis, a 
difference between the shadow price of capital and the cost of credit, or changes in 
production activities in response to a change in eligibility status to formal credit. The 
second type of methodology is a semi-direct method as it uses access to the credit market 
to identify credit constraints. The third approach uses direct questioning of households or 
production units on their realized and latent credit experiences. We detail in the following 
these approaches and their most influential papers. 
 
2.1. Indirect methods of eliciting credit constraint 
One of the testable implications of the permanent income/ consumption-
smoothing hypothesis is that in the absence of liquidity constraints, consumption changes 
are correlated with significant changes in lagged earnings or predicted changes in earning 
but not with transitory income shocks (Hall, 1978; Deaton, 1992). Various studies have 
thus used the rejection of the permanent income hypothesis as a test for the existence of 
liquidity constraints. Zeldes (1989) is one of the most influential of these studies, which 
used an a priori classification of liquidity constraint. Zeldes divides his sample based on 
whether the household holds at least two months of income as assets. His test relies on 
the fact that, if the ratio of wealth and financial assets to disposable income is a good 
indicator of liquidity constraints, the permanent income hypothesis is likely to be verified 
for households with high assets and rejected for low-wealth households. Indeed, Zeldes 
finds that lagged income is only significant for the low asset group.4 Several other papers 
have tested the permanent income hypothesis but no consensus has been reached on 
whether there is excess sensitivity of consumption to transitory income shocks that would 
be attributed to credit constraints (see Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Besley (1995) 
for a review). Moreover, Browning and Lusardi (p1832-1833) list several empirical and 
theoretical reasons that might lead to the rejection of the permanent income hypothesis 
                                                 
4 Jappelli (1990) however shows that the use of exogenous and fixed ratios is inappropriate to proxy 
liquidity constraints because it leads to the inclusion of unconstrained households in the low-wealth group 
and constrained households in the high-wealth group  (see Jappelli, 1990, p. 232-233 for a numerical 
example). 
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even in the absence of liquidity constraints. Carroll (1992), for example, explains the 
rejection of the permanent income hypothesis due to precautionary savings behavior.  
Sial and Carter (1996) used another type of indirect method to test for credit 
constraints. They estimate the shadow price of credit for small Pakistani farmers and find 
a large gap between the shadow price and the prevailing formal market loan rates. They 
attribute this large gap (around 190% for non borrowing farmers and around 60% at the 
mean loan size) to credit constraints faced by the farmers. However, this approach 
requires detailed information on revenues, cost and technology and is difficult to 
implement when there is heterogeneity of production activity and technologies both 
within and across households. Moreover, as explained earlier, other element of the credit 
contract such as collateral requirement or repayment schedules might generate a 
substantial difference between the nominal interest rate and the total credit cost. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2002) provide a new approach to determine whether firms 
are credit rationed based on firms’ reaction to a change in eligibility of directed lending 
programs. Both constrained and unconstrained firms are likely to be willing to borrow 
more from the formal sector if it is cheaper than other credit sources.  If the increase in 
formal borrowing does not translate to production growth, the authors argue that firms are 
unconstrained and use the additional credit as a substitute for other borrowing. Credit 
constrained firms on the contrary will use it to expand their production. While this 
approach provides an interesting test of credit rationing it is applicable only in a context 
where a policy change in the supply of credit can be clearly identified. Furthermore, 
translating this approach to rural households might be problematic if credit is fungible 
and the increase in formal credit does not translate to an increase in agricultural or non-
agricultural production but an increase in asset accumulation or consumption 
expenditures. 
 
2.2. Approaches based on realized credit transactions 
A second class of methods uses observable market outcomes to elicit credit 
rationing. Earlier studies have proxied credit rationing by the absence or non-use of 
formal loans. However, this is likely to be a crude approximation since, as previously 
shown, there is no simple relationship between credit rationing or credit constraints and 
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borrowing. Borrowing households could be willing to borrow more without having 
access to additional credit. Other households may also choose not to borrow because they 
are risk averse. In addition, these studies often assume that borrowing from the formal 
credit market is always preferable to borrowing from the informal credit market given the 
high value of local moneylenders’ interest rates. 
Kochar (1991, 1997) presents a model of access to credit that relaxes these 
assumptions. Using estimates of the informal and formal marginal interest rate for both 
borrowers and non-borrowers, she is able to determine whether the formal sector should 
be preferred to the informal sector.5 Unfortunately Kochar cannot distinguish between 
constrained and unconstrained non-borrowing households and assumes that non-applicant 
households have no demand for credit. This prevents us from classifying as credit 
constraints discouraged borrowers that did not apply because they thought they would be 
denied or because they were too far from a lender. While Kochar mentions that borrowers 
that borrow from both the formal and the informal sector are likely to be quantity 
constrained by the formal sector, this is not taken into account in the analysis that focuses 
on access and only indirectly on credit rationing. Bali Swain (2002) uses Kochar’s model 
and adjusts its empirical specification using information on rejection of loan applications. 
As the author recognizes, the empirical specification still lacks information on quantity 
credit constraints and discouraged borrowers, which does not allow her to provide a 
complete picture of credit constrained borrowers. 
 
2.3. Direct elicitation of credit constraints 
Three types of direct questions have been used to elicit credit constraints based on 
household’s experiences of rejection and need for credit. The first approach first applied 
by Jappelli (1990), and followed by Zeller (1994), classifies households as credit 
constrained if they report any rejected application of credit or report being granted less 
than the amount they initially asked for and were not able to get the corresponding 
amount through another credit application. Households that did not apply because they 
thought they would have been turned down are also classified as credit constrained. 
                                                 
5 The preference of the formal sector is also likely to depend on other elements of the loan contract such 
transaction cost, collateral requirements, repayment schedules. 
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Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) asked all adult households members their perceived 
credit limit with different types of lenders and classify the households as credit 
constrained if at least one of its members has reached this credit limit. This approach still 
lacks information on excess demand and relies on the hypothesis that the household 
members that have reached their credit limit with a certain type of lender would have 
liked to borrow more from that lender and thus can be classified a credit constrained. It is 
also unclear why credit constraints of individual household members can easily translate 
to household level binding credit limit. 
The strength of the type of questions used by Feder, Lau, Lin and Luo (1990) is 
that they rely on no assumptions and directly ask borrowing households whether they 
would have liked more institutional credit at the going rates of interest. Non-borrowing 
households were also asked the reason for not borrowing. Borrowing households, which 
would have liked more institutional credit and non-borrowing households, which reported 
that they did not borrow because they could not obtain credit, were classified as credit 
constrained. This approach has been subsequently used by Braham, Boucher and Carter 
(1996). It relies on the ability of the respondent to perceive credit constraints and report 
them, but the perception of the households on their credit experience is also more likely 
to have a more significant impact on their behavior than their ‘true’ credit constraint 
status. The type of classification by Feder, Lau, Lin and Luo is the one that we will 
follow in this paper as it relaxes all assumptions on credit constraints and is the one that 
fits best our definition of credit constraints in terms of unsatisfied positive marginal 
demand for credit. 
 
2.4. Findings of the empirical literature on the determinants of credit constraints 
From the above-mentioned literature, only the papers by Jappelli (1990) and by 
Feder, Lau, Lin and Luo (1990) and Zeller (1994) have proceeded to an estimation of the 
determinants of credit constraints. The three empirical models estimate a reduced form of 
credit constraints since both demand (how much the household would like to borrow) and 
supply (how much the financial intermediaries are willing to lend to that household) 
affect credit constraints. All three studies differ in terms of samples and estimation 
methods.  Japelli’s (1990) study is on American households; Feder et al. (1990) is based 
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on a survey of Chinese farm households (see table 1), and Zeller (1994) on individual 
household members from Madagascar. Moreover, the determinants of credit constraints 
analyzed and their impact are not directly comparable. The study by Feder and al. and the 
study by Japelli show that savings, income and wealth have a negative impact on credit 
rationning whereas the number of adults in the households and the family size has a 
positive impact on credit rationing. In the study by Japelli, other demographic variables 
such as age, marital status and race reduce the probability of being credit constrained6. 
These studies identify savings and income as significant determinants of credit constraint 
status but these variables are also subject to endogeneity bias. Exogenous measures of 
income and wealth should thus be preferred. 
 
3. The empirical model 
Our empirical model is based on an agricultural household model from which we derive 
the demand for funds of the household.7 Most of our sample households (72.5%) have 
some productive activity: 44% of them are engaged in farming only, 10% are engaged in 
non-agricultural activities only and another 18.5% are engaged in both farming and non-
agricultural activities. We thus allow for two productive activities in our model. We 
assume that household members pool their resources and that decisions on expenditures 
on production and consumption are taken at the household level. In this model, credit 
constraints are thus defined at the household level and not at the individual level. Our 
estimations are based on reduced forms of credit rationing. 
Every household maximizes a utility function subject to a budget and a time 
constraint. For simplicity of exposition, we will present a simple two period model where 
the household maximizes the utility that it derives from its consumption of 
undifferentiated goods C and of leisure L: 
),,,( 2121
2121
LLCCUMax
LLCC
          (1) 
                                                 
6 Other variables used in the estimation but with no impact on credit rationing include for the study by 
Feder et al.: land, capital, number of dependents, education, farm experience, total initial liquid assets, 
outstanding debt in financial institutions, total outstanding debt and previous loan default and for the study 
by Japelli: debt, education, unemployment and sex. 
7 See Iqbal (1986) for a presentation of a model of demand for funds of an agriculturalhousehold. 
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where the time subscript 1 refers to the recall period of the survey and the time subscript 
2 refers to the “future” period and is meant to capture the duration of the relevant 
repayment period. The maximization of this function is subject to a budget and time 
constraint for each of the two periods:8 
babbbbbaaaaa IICFMwNHKfpNHKfp ++=+++ 11111111111 ),,(),,(  (2a) 
)1(),,(),,( 22222222222 rFCMwNHKfpNHKfp bbbbbaaaaa ++=++ µλ  (2b) 
1111 LMHHT ba +++=        (2c) 
2222 LMHHT ba +++=        (2d) 
where the subscript a refers to agricultural activity and b to non agricultural businesses, 
and: 
pa, pb: price of agricultural and non agricultural output 
Ka1, Kb1: initial endowment of productive capital used for agriculture production and non-
agricultural business, respectively 
Ha, Hb: family labor used in the household farm and in the household’s non-agricultural 
business, respectively 
Na, Nb: on-farm hired labor, hired labor used for the family business. 
M: net market labor supply 
w: market wage rate 
F: level of fund requirements 
C: consumption 
Ia, Ib: farm and off-farm business investment and input expenditures such that K2=K1+ϕI 
and ϕ is the share of investment expenditures in investment and input expenditures. 
λ,µ: technical improvement parameter of the farm and non farm sector 
r: interest rate or cost of funds 
T: total household available time 
L: leisure or non-market time 
 
                                                 
8 The model of Iqbal (1986) included only the agriculture sector. We have separated hired labor used in 
household production from family labor. 
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pa and pb should be interpreted as price vectors  and fa, fb, vectors of production functions 
when the household produces different crops or is engaged in  different non-agricultural 
businesses. 
The demand for funds (F) is defined in the previous system as the difference between 
investment and savings and can be rewritten as: 
FALEBF −−= 9           (3) 
Where the demand for fund (F) is the sum of change in liabilities (B, borrowing – LE, 
lending) and change in internal borrowing (FA, net change in financial assets). 
We define credit constraints as the situation where the household cannot avail the credit it 
desires at the prevailing relevant market conditions. The prevailing relevant market 
conditions, Pm, are in this case defined by the expected rates of interest (r) in the area 
associated to loan sizes (L), repayment schedules (RS) and level of guaranties (G); 
Pm={rm, Lm, RSm, Gm}. 
A household will thus be credit constrained if: 
babbbbbaaaaa IICFMwNHKfpNHKfp
**
1
*
1111111111 ),,(),,( ++<+++    (4a) 
babbbbbaaaaa IICFALBMwNHKfpNHKfp
**
1
*
1111111111 ),,(),,( ++<−−+++   (4b) 
or, using simplified notation: 
FALEYIICPBB bam ++−++=< 11 ***)(*        (4c) 
where Y1, the total income in the first period, equals 
1111111111 ),,(),,( MwNHKfpNHKfp bbbbbaaaaa ++   
*BB <  corresponds to C1<C1* or Ia<Ia* or Ib<Ib* or any combination of these sub 
constraints and where B is the credit limit of the household and B* its optimal level of 
borrowing at the prevailling relevant market conditions. C1*, Ia*, Ib* are respectively the 
optimal level of consumption expenditures and farm and off-farm level of investment and 
input expenditures that would be chosen in the absence of credit constraints. 
Equation (4c) shows that two factors determine whether the credit constraint will 
be binding. The left hand side of the inequality represents the credit taken by the 
household or the household’s credit limit when the constraint is binding, i. e. how much 
                                                 
9 We did not include the variation of the stock of consumer durables in this equation since rural Filipino 
households do not normally use such stocks to make liquidity adjustments. 
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financial intermediaries are willing to lend to the household. The right hand side 
determines the amount the household would like to borrow. 
 
The life-cycle model does not deliver a closed-form solution for the optimal 
consumption level C* in the presence of borrowing constraints. Moreover, production 
and consumption are no longer separable.  We follow the assumptions made by Jappelli 
(1990) for his empirical model for the estimation of consumption credit constraints:10 
Assumption 1: The reduced form of C*, Ia*, Ib* can be expressed as C*=αcX + εc, 
Ia*=αIaX + εIa, Ib*=αIbX + εIb, where X is a matrix of observable variables such as 
household demographic characteristics, age and education of the household head, wealth, 
production choices and accessibility of lenders. 
Assumption 2: The debt ceiling, B, can also be expressed as a function of the same 
observable variables: B=βX + η.  
We can thus provide the following reduced form of equation (4c): 
ZFALEYX IbIacIIc ba =−+++++−−++< ηεεεβααα 1)(0    (5) 
The optimal level of consumption and investment of the household as well as its 
credit limit is unobservable but we can identify the households that were credit 
constrained based on their answer to the question “During the past 12 months, would you 
have used more credit if it was available to you?”. Furthermore, since we have asked this 
question by use, for agricultural production, non-agricultural business and non-food 
expenditures, we can identify which decision is affected by the credit constraint. We can 
thus define the following three latent credit constraints equations: 
Za*= λaX+µa  
Zb*= λbX+µb  
Zc*= λcX+µc  
where λi are linear combinations of the parameters in (4c) and Za*, Zb*, Zc*, the latent 
variables representing respectively the reduction in the level of agricultural (Ia*-Ia) 
investment, reduction in the level of non-farm business investment (Ib*-Ib) and reduction 
in the consumption level (C1*-C1), attributed to credit constraints. 
                                                 
10 Production decisions aren’t taken into account in Japelli (1990)’s model. 
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The corresponding index function for consumtion is the following: 
Zc=1 if λcX+µc >0  
Zc=0 if λcX+µc ≤0  
which reads: when Zc=1, the household is credit constrained and its consumption decision 
is affected (C1*>C1), otherwise, C1*=C1 
The two production index functions are defined similarly with the subscript a for 
agricultural production and b for non agricultural business. 
 
Following the previous discussion, the set of regressors to be used in the 
estimation of credit constraint will be composed of variables that influence the demand 
for credit as well as variables that influence the credit limit the household faces. Since we 
estimate reduced forms, we will not be able to separately identify supply and demand 
influences on credit constraints. When supply and demand have opposite effects, some 
variables may not have a significant impact. Furthermore, some variables might have 
some impact on the demand for funds for production but not for consumption and vice 
versa. In the following, we discuss the variables we used in our analysis and their impact 
that we summarize in table 2. 
The demand for consumption funds 11 is increasing with the size of the household 
but the demand for production funds12 is decreasing with the size of the household as 
household labor substitutes for hired labor. 
The productive experience of the household increase with the age of the 
household head and so does the demand for productive funds. We use a quadratic form of 
the age of the household head to allow for the diminishing impact of age.13 Credit limit 
should also increase with the productive experience of the household leading to an 
ambiguous sign of age of the household head.14 
                                                 
11 In the following, we refer to non-food expenditure as consumption to ease the reading. 
12 When unspecified, production refers to both agricultural and non-agricultural production. 
13 The diminishing impact of age could be explained by a reduction of marginal experience gain with age. 
The stock of productive assets also increases with age and could aslo lead to diminishing impact of age on 
the demand for fund. 
14 A diminishing impact of age on credit ceiling could also be explained by reduced marginal experience 
gain with age. It could also be explained by higher probabilities of death as age increase if debt is difficult 
to transfer to children in case of death. 
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Better-educated households are expected to be better able to exploit investment 
opportunities when they arise and generate higher incomes in the future. Therefore, the 
demand for production funds is likely to increase with education of the household head. 
Education is also supposed to increase the demand for funds for consumption through 
expectations of a higher income in the future. The same arguments play in the same 
direction for the assessment of repayment capacity on the demand side, leading to an 
ambiguous sign. We use the percentage of households members over 14 years old with 
six or more years of education for the education of the household. 
Size of cultivated land increases with the area of titled land and so do farm 
working capital. On the supply side, titled land can serve as collateral and increase the 
credit limit of the household. The area of titled land is also a proxy for wealth and is 
associated with better repayment capacity. Sugar producers have higher working capital 
requirements as each sugar cane sapling can be used for two to three planting seasons 
only, while expense in fertilizer and harvesting costs (use of harvesters and transportation 
costs) are higher. Sugar producers are thus more likely to use more credit for their 
agricultural production and thus have less external funds available to finance their other 
needs.  
Households often cope with negative shocks by incurring loans or liquidating part 
of their financial assets. In the aftermath of such a shock, their stock of financial assets 
available for production and consumption is depleted which translate in a larger demand 
for external funds to keep the level of production and consumption expenditures constant. 
On the supply side, the increase in the level of household debt or the decrease in its 
financial assets (and capacity to cope with future shocks) affects negatively the amount 
the lenders are willing to lend to the household for production and consumption 
expenditures. Positive covariant shocks affecting the households increase their 
investment opportunities and thus their demand for credit.  
The last group of variables that we will consider refers to the accessibility of 
financial intermediaries. The availability of credit services in a village is increasing with 
the number of government and NGO credit programs and decreasing with the distance to 
commercial banks. If lenders are constrained in the total amount they can lend or if there 
is little flexibility in their contractual arrangements, making their financial services de 
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facto unavailable for some of the households, then the availability of credit services in the 
village can increase the credit limit of some households. 
To limit the extent of endogeneity bias, we did not  include direct measures of 
savings, debt, income and non-food expenditures in our set of regressors as was done in 
previous studies, even if lenders use them to assess creditworthiness. 
The following table summarizes the expected impact of our regressors on the 
external optimal demand for funds and credit limit. Variables that have a positive impact 
on the demand for funds increase the probability that the household is credit constrained 
whereas variables that have a positive impact on the household credit limit decrease its 
probability of being credit constrained. 
 
Table 2 Predicted impact of the regressors on demand and 
supply side of credit constraints 
 
 Demand for funds 
 
Net impact on 
credit 
constraints 
Agricultural 
production (A) 
Family business 
(B) 
Non-food 
expenditures(C) 
Supply credit limit
Household size (A) & (B): - 
(C):+ - - +  
Age of the 
household head/ 
age squared 
ambiguous +/- +/-  +/- 
Education ambiguous + + + + 
Titled land (A): ambiguous 
(B)&(C):- +   + 
Sugar producer 
+ +   
- for family business 
and consumption  
(through indebtness) 
Individual 
negative shocks + + (through less internal funds) 
+ (through less 
internal funds) 
+ (through less 
internal funds) 
- (through possible 
impact on debt/ 
income ratio of the 
household) 
Collective 
positive shocks ambiguous 
+ (through better 
investment 
opportunities) 
+ (through better 
investment 
opportunities) 
+ (through better 
investment 
opportunities) 
+ (through better 
investment 
opportunities) 
Presence of 
credit programs -    
+ (through 
availability of credit) 
Distance to 
commercial 
banks 
+    - (through availability of credit) 
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There are alternative candidate econometric strategies to estimate these three 
index functions. The first one is to estimate the three equations using three independent 
probits. However we observe the agricultural credit constraint outcome only on the 
subsample of agricultural producers (62.6%) and we observe the non agricultural credit 
outcome only on the subsample of households (28.3%) that operate a non agricultural 
business (table 3). It is possible that the agricultural households don’t share the same 
characteristics as the non agricultural households resulting in biased coefficients of these 
two probit models. We thus tested for selection bias for these two equations.  
 
Table 3 Repartition of the sample households based on their production status 
    
Household operates a 
non agricultural 
business?   
    Yes No Total 
Yes 106 252 358 
(% total sample) 18.5 44 62.6 
(% row) 29.6 70.4 100 
(% column) 65.4 61.5  
No 56 158 214 
(% total sample) 9.8 27.6 37.4 
(% row) 26.2 73.8 100 
Household is 
engaged in 
agricultural 
production? 
(% column) 34.6 38.5  
  Total 162 410 572 
 (% row) 28.3 71.7  
  (% column) 100 100   
 
The probit model with sample selection assumes that we observe the binary 
outcome (Zjprobit =(Zj*>0)) of an underlying relationship (Zj=λXj+µj) and that this binary 
outcome is however only observed if: 
Sjselect=(γWj +φj>0)=1   , where µ ~ N(0,1); φ ~ N(0,1) and corr(µ,φ)=ρ 
When ρ≠0, standard probit will yield biased results. The test of the selection bias is based 
on the comparison of the likelihood of the full model with the sum of the log likelihoods 
for the probit and selection models, which are equal if ρ=0 (see Van de Ven and Van 
Pragg (1981) and Greene (2003)). 
Performing this test for the probit of agriculture specific credit constraint (Za) 
controlling for the probability of  being an agricultural producer household did not reject 
the hypothesis that ρ=0, suggesting that estimates from the simple probit do not  suffer 
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from selection bias.15 Similarly, the same test for the non-agriculture business specific 
credit constraint (Zb) did not lead us to reject the null hypothesis of the absence of sample 
bias.16 
 
The coefficients of the three independant probit might still be biased  as it is likely 
that some household level omitted variables jointly determine the error terms, µc, µa, µb, 
of these three index functions. Indeed, on the demand side, in the presence of credit 
constraints, production and consumption are jointly determined. On the supply side, we 
could argue that the household faces different credit limits based on the use of credit. 
This is justified when the lender can monitor loan uses or when the terms of the contracts 
like the repayment schedule do not allow the borrower to divert part of the loan from the 
use agreed with the lender. But at least part of the credit limit (if not all) is determined at 
the household level.17 The structure of the error terms therefore could be written as: 
µc=vcµhh+ucµhhc 
µa=vaµhh+uaµhha 
µb=vbµhh+ubµhhb 
If vc= va= vb=0, then estimating the three probit models separately will yield the 
same results as estimating them simultaneously, otherwise, estimating the three equations 
simultaneously will yield less biased coefficients. The trivariate probit (for further details, 
see Greene, 2003) assumes that we observe the binary outcomes (Zajprobit =(Zaj*>0), 
                                                 
15 The likelihood ratio test estimated the probability that ρ=0 was of 49%. The instruments used for the 
identification of the selection equation for being an agricultural producer are the size of the farm of the 
household in 1984 and the size of the farm in 1984 interacted with a dummy for being a split household (a 
split household is a new household in 2003 formed by one of the children of a household interviewed in 
1984). These instruments have been tested with a Wald test that the coefficients of the instruments in the 
second equation are equal to zero. 
16 The likelihood ratio test estimated the probability that ρ=0 was of 82%. For the non-agricultural business 
producers, the instruments used are the net revenue from non-agricultural business in 1984 and its 
interaction with the dummy for split households. These instruments have been tested with a Wald test that 
the coefficients of the instruments in the second equation are equal to zero. 
17 In this case, B=Bhh+Bc+Ba+Bb. The credit limit of the household is the sum of a household level credit 
limit and additional credit limits specific to consumption,  agriculture and off-farm business respectively. 
We provide some examples that can illustrate such cases: a household could avail of a loan from a relative 
to finance education expenditures but that relative might not be willing to provide the same loan to finance 
production expenditures; a farmer credit cooperative might be willing to provide the household with a loan 
for financing its agricultural production but no other needs. 
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Zbjprobit =(Zbj*>0) and Zcjprobit =(Zcj*>0)) of three underlying relationships (Zaj=λaXaj+µaj, 
Zbj=λbXbj+µbj and Zcj=λcXcj+µcj) that might be interrelated. 
In this case, a general specification is to assume that the errors terms in the three 
latent equations jointly follow a trivariate mormal distribution so that (µaj, µbj, µcj)’ ~ 
N(0,Σ), where the variance-covariance matrix Σ is given by: 
 1 ρab ρac 
Σ =  ρba 1 ρbc ,  
  ρca ρcb 1 
where ρij denotes the correlation coefficient of µi and µj (i,j=a,b,c; i≠j). 
Separate probit models are “nested” in the trivariate probit model and occur when 
ρab=ρac=ρcb=0, which means that we can test whether the trivariate probit model fits the 
data better than separate models. A likelihood ratio test rejected the joint absence of 
correlation in the error terms (each correlation coefficient being also significant and 
positive) and supported the use of the trivariate probit models to better estimate the 
impact of the different variables.18 The trivariate probit model will thus provide the best 
technique to estimate the different dimensions of credit constraints that the sample 
households are facing. As previously mentioned, we don’t observe the three index 
functions for all households as only producing households were asked the production 
credit constrained questions. Our model can therefore be estimated maximising the 
following log-likelihood function: 
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18 The likelihood ratio test rejected the hypothesis that the covariance of the error terms of the three models 
is equal to zero with a probability of error of less than 0.1%. 
 20
Where the subscript j refers to the household and abcjI  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if we can observe Za, Zb, and Zc, i.e. if the household j is engaged 
in both agricultural and non agricultural productive activities. acjI , 
bc
jI , and 
c
jI  are 
similarly constructed with acjI  taking the value of one if the household is engaged in 
agriculture production only; bcjI  taking the value of one if the household is engaged in 
non agriculture production only and cjI  taking the value of one if the household doesn’t 
operate any productive activity for itself. 
)/,,( jcba XlZnZmZp === is derived from the cumulative distribution of the 
standard trivariate normal distribution that we simulated with the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) simulator. 
)/,( jca XlZmZp ==  and )/,( jcb XlZnZp ==  are derived from the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard bivariate normal distribution and )/( jc XlZp =  form 
the standard normal distribution. 
Results of the three independent probit models as well as results of the production 
probit with sample selection are reproduced in annex 1. 
 
4. Setting, sample and survey instruments 
4.1. Description of the survey setting and sample 
This study uses an original household survey conducted by IFPRI during the 
months of September 2003 to January 2004 in Southern Bukidnon, province of Mindanao 
in the Philippines. In 1995, Bukidnon represented 1.4% of the population of the 
Philippines (PPDO, 2003). According to the 2003 National Statistical Coordination 
Board estimates on poverty, 39.6% of the population of Bukidnon falls under the national 
poverty line. Bukidnon is a landlocked province that derives most of its income from 
agriculture with corn (42.9% of the total cultivated crop area), rice (21.19%) and sugar 
(13.75%) being the major crops cultivated (PPDO, 2003). The setting of this study thus 
differs from previous studies on credit markets in the Philippines that were focused on 
rice growing areas (Floro and Yotopopulos, 1991; Nagarajan, David and Meyer, 1992; 
Nagarajan, Meyer and Hushak, 1998; Fafchamps and Lund, 2001 and Fafchamps and 
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Gubert, 2002). Our sample is composed of 572 rural households, 311 of whom were 
previously surveyed in 1984. The remaining 261 households are splits of these original 
households (new households established by son/daughters and their spouses) who settled 
in the same survey barangays.19 The sampling design in 1984 reflects the primary 
objective of the previous study, to examine theimpact of agricultural commercialization.  
At that time, agricultural commercialization occurred through a a switch from the 
cultivation of corn, a subsistence crop, to the cultivation of sugar, a cash crop. 
Consequently, the sample was designed to include adequate representation of both corn 
and sugarcane-farming households. This was done by choosing households from 
barangays (villages) in the vicinity of the (then) only sugar mill, as well barangays 
outside this vicinity. Within the chosen barangays, household samples were drawn to 
provide adequate representation of different categories of cultivator groups as determined 
by a village census conducted prior to that survey.20 
 
4.2. Participation in the credit market. 
Rural households in Bukidnon are frequent users of credit. Three quarters 
(75.35%) of the sample households were engaged in at least one credit transaction within 
the past year.21 The sources of credit prevalent in the area can be classified into three 
groups, namely formal, semi-formal, and informal institutions. Formal institutions 
include banks and pawnshops. Among banks, rural banks traditionally lend to small 
farmers and microenterprises, while commercial banks finance large-scale agriculture. 
Some private thrift banks cater to small and medium enterprises located in the 
countryside and government financial institutions such as the Land Bank of the 
Philippines lend to private rural financial institutions such as rural banks and cooperatives 
on a wholesale basis. The latter in turn provide retail loans to small farmers and other 
small-scale economic agents. Semi-formal institutions comprise cooperatives, non-
government organizations, credit association, commercial store that provide appliance or 
                                                 
19 The barangay is the smallest political unit in Philippine government. 
20 Further details on the 2003 sample and on the evolution of financial transactions between 1984 and 2003 
are provided in Godquin and Sharma (2004). An overview of financial institutions in Bukidnon is also 
provided in Morales (2004). 
21 If we exclude the loans that were outstanding prior to the beginning of the one-year recall period, 71% of 
the sample households had incurred at least a loan in the past year. 
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consumer durable loans and “lending investors”. Lending investors are companies that 
are engaged in lending with minimum regulatory requirement and supervision but are not 
allowed to collect saving deposits of any kind. The informal lenders are composed of 
relatives, friends, farmers, traders or local moneylenders. Twelve percent  (12.24%) of 
our sample households had incurred at least one loan from a formal institution, 28.15% 
from a semi-formal intermediary and 54.72% from an informal intermediary.22  
 
4.3. Survey instruments for eliciting credit constraint status. 
In this paper, we use the type of questions used by Feder, Lau, Lin and Luo 
(1990) to classify the households as credit constrained. In order to have a more detailed 
approach to credit rationing, we differentiated these questions by credit use so that we 
could construct production and consumption specific credit rationing variables. The 
rationale for this differentiation was that in our survey area as well as in other parts of the 
world, many cooperatives, banks and targeted programs have developed many types of 
production loans, but fewer options are available to finance consumption related 
expenditures such as health or education expenditures. The above-mentioned 
specialization of the type of loans financed by the different lenders gives some support to 
this statement. 
Owing to the heterogeneity of loan sources and of credit needs, it is thus possible 
that the households face use-specific credit limits. Households that have no access to 
credit due to the absence of lenders or because their credit limit is equal to zero are more 
likely to be credit constraints across different credit uses, conditional on having a positive 
demand for credit across all credit uses. If credit is not perfectly fungible because of 
repayment schedules, monitoring of the lender, or timing issues in the allocation of funds,  
then it is possible that household that could avail of more credit for production if they 
wanted to could  be credit constrained for consumption loans. 
We therefore constructed three credit constraint dummy variables reflecting credit 
constraints affecting agricultural production, non-agricultural business and non-food 
                                                 
22 Further details on the loan contracts, on the use of the loans, on the segmentation of the credit market and 
on the role of credit in financing health and education expenses, agricultural cost and setting up of non-
agricultural business are provided in Godquin and Sharma (2004). 
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consumption (clothing, health expenditures, education are some of the items covered)23. 
These variables take the value of one if the household answered positively to the 
following questions respectively: 
- If more production credit had been available to you in the past 12 months, would 
you have used it?24 
- If more credit had been available to you for your business in the past 12 months, 
would you have used it?25 
- If more credit had been available to you in the past 12 months to finance any of 
those items, would you have used it?26 
The households that answered yes to any of these questions should thus borrow more if 
more credit is made available to them. No specific restrictions were mentioned on the 
contractual arrangements and it was understood that the respondent had their relevant 
expected market conditions in mind responding to these questions. The first question was 
asked to households that reporting farming activity only (358 of the 572 survey 
households, 63%) and the second was asked to only those households that were operating 
a non-agricultural business (162 households, 28% of the sample).  
The last question was asked uniformly to all the households. The same type of 
question has also been asked for major consumption durables and non-land assets. 
However the potential credit uses covered by that question are overlapping with the needs 
covered by the above-mentioned questions and we used the response to the question on 
the intended use of this additional credit to update the responses to the three selected 
credit constraint variables.27 
                                                 
23 No question related to credit constraints affecting food consumption was asked in the food consumption 
module even though credit use was collected in this module. 
24 This question was asked at the end of the block collecting information on agricultural production 
activities and input use. 
25 This question was asked at the end of the block collecting information on non-agricultural business. 
26 This question was asked at the end of the non-food expenditure block. 
27 If a household responded to that question that it would have liked more credit to purchase farm inputs, it 
was classified as agricultural production credit constrained (2 households reclassified). This question had 
no impact on the classification of households regarding the non-agricultural business and consumption 
credit constraint variables. However, 9 households that had no family businesses expressed the need for 
credit to invest in such a business. We did not  use this information since we will need to control for 
selection of the households and need to keep only the households that operated a family business for 
estimations of family busines specific credit constraints. 
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We also asked all households whether, during the past year, they “needed any 
credit for which they didn’t apply”. For the households that responded positively to this 
question, we further asked what they would have done with the corresponding credit. The 
three credit constraint variables were further checked with the response to this question.28  
This led us to the following credit constraint classifications of the households: 
 
Table 4 Production and consumption credit constraint variables 
 Agricultural production Family business Consumption 
Unconstrained 224 (63%) 111 (69%) 450 (79%) 
Constrained 134 (37%) 51 (31%) 122 (21%) 
Number  of 
households 358 162 572 
 
There are 414 households engaged in either agriculture or off farm businesses or 
both, 39% of which are credit constrained in their production decisions.29 
 
We also asked the households that reported they did not  want more credit why 
they were not  interested in more credit, allowing the households to give up to three 
responses. The analysis of these responses (table 5) indicates that the level of credit 
rationing might actually be higher. Only 18% of the responses for agricultural production 
could be associated with a real absence of credit need (have enough money, landowner 
pays expenditures, too much debt already, not used to borrowing, credit not necessary). 
Thirty households reported that they did not own the required collateral and 64 reported 
that the interest and other costs were too high, indicating some extent of price rationing. 
If we consider that the households that report that interest rates and other costs 
were too high or that they didn’t own the required collateral are credit constrained, we 
                                                 
28 This has lead to 14 reclassifications of households as agriculture production credit constrained, 1 as non-
agricultural business credit constrained and 19 as consumption credit constrained. Among households that 
were not agricultural producers, 4 expressed agriculture related credit need and 2 households that were not 
operating any family business reported business related credit need. 
29 This figure doesn’t derive directly from table 4 as some households that are engaged in both agricultural 
and non agricultural activities can be constrained on one of their production activity only but be counted as 
constrained in their production decisions. 
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observe a sharp increase in the level of credit rationing:30 59% of the agricultural 
producers31 and 43% of the non agricultural producer would be constrained. 
 
Table 5 Reasons why the households didn’t want more credit to finance their production 
 
Agricultural 
production Family business Reasons for no interest in additional 
credit Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Interest rate and other costs too high 64 20.71 15 13.39 
Do not own required collateral 30 9.71 5 4.46 
Afraid cannot pay back 150 48.54 65 58.04 
Afraid of losing collateral 9 2.91 3 2.68 
Have enough money 41 13.27 20 17.86 
Too much debt already 6 1.94   
Landowner pays expenditures 4 1.29   
Not used to borrowing 2 0.65   
Area is too small/credit not necessary 3 0.97   
Do not like borrowing   4 3.57 
Total 309 100 112 100 
 
This reclassification of production-constrained status would lead to an increase in the 
overall level of credit rationing from 39% up to 52%. If the credit market is competitive, 
interest rates should reflect the risk faced by the lender and only changes in the level of 
risk of the demand side can reduce price rationing. The high proportion of households 
that report that they would not  have used more credit because interest rates were too high 
suggest a need for interventions such as implementation of risk reducing agricultural 
technologies or credit bureaus aimed at reducing risk. In the remainder of the paper, we 
will use the direct answers of the households regarding their marginal credit needs and 
use the variables as defined in table 4. 
Households  can have unsatisfied credit needs other than production or non-food 
consumption credit needs as revealed by the response to the question on the use of the 
                                                 
30 Households that reported that they did not want more credit for consumption were not asked why they 
were not interested in more credit for consumption.  
31 Two households reported that the interest rates and other costs were too high but also that either it had 
enough money or that it already had too much deb.  These two households were not reclassified as credit 
constrained. 
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credit that the household needed in the past year but didn’t ask for (see above).32 Around 
20% of the households (104 households) reported that they needed credit that they didn’t 
ask for food consumption. 
 
Table 6 Purpose of the ‘discouraged’ loan needs 
Purpose of the discouraged loans Freq. Percent
Food expenditures Food consumption 104 28.73
Education 29 8.01
Health 25 6.91
Clothing 1 0.28
Traveling expenses 4 1.1
Marriage/family events 4 1.1
Non-food 
expenditures 
Improving dwelling unit 16 4.42
Means of transport 4 1.1Assets and consumer 
durables Consumer durables 29 8.01
Farm inputs 66 18.23
Farm equipments 2 0.55
Purchase animals 18 4.97
Agricultural 
production 
Purchase/lease of agricultural lands 6 1.66
Purchase of goods for trade 24 6.63
Purchase of inputs and working capital 19 5.25
Purchase of equipment 3 0.83
Non-agricultural 
business 
Additional capital for business 1 0.28
Refinancing Debt repayment/refinancing 7 1.94
  Total 362 100
 
The analysis of the reasons why the households did not  apply for these loans indicate 
that most of these are discouraged credit transactions: 
 
Table 7 Reason why the households didn’t apply for some loan need 
Reasons for not applying Freq. Percent
Credit too costly Interest rates and other costs too high 60 9.6
Not enough land collateral 7 1.12Not enough 
collateral Not enough other collateral 40 6.4
Had to work/sell produce to the lender 1 0.16Unsatisfied with 
other terms of Usual repayment period too short 7 1.12
                                                 
32 303 (53%) of the households reported that they needed credit in the past year that they didn’t ask for and 
were given the possibility to provide up to two purposes of these credit needs. 
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Usual frequency of installment inadequate 2 0.32
Too much time before the credit is given 4 0.64
Did not like to mortgage 3 0.48
Too many requirements 6 0.96
Didn't like the terms & conditions of the loan 2 0.32
Loan need too small 6 0.96
the contract 
Loan need too large 1 0.16
Lender too far 7 1.12No available 
lender Did not know anybody who could lend me 8 1.28
Afraid to lose collateral 16 2.56
Afraid to incur extra fees for late repayment 179 28.64
Afraid of the 
consequences of 
credit Afraid of having bad repayment reputation 50 8
Think lender would not approve loan 18 2.88
Not able to meet with lender/ ashamed to borrow 2 0.32Self-selection, other 
Did not understand the agreement 1 0.16
Too much debt already 63 10.08
No stable job/income to pay loan 10 1.6
Found work/receive remittance from children 9 1.44
Spouse did not give consent 1 0.16
Disliked borrowing 67 10.72
No interest in 
additional loan 
No longer need any loan 55 8.8
  Total 625 100
  
 
We also asked the households whether any loan they applied for in the past year had been 
rejected. Thirty one percent of the households (180) were rejected for at least one loan 
and only 38% of these were able to get one of these rejected loans from another lender.  
In an attempt to provide a global picture of credit constraints we considered the following 
types of households as credit constrained:33 (1) households that experienced at least one 
rejection for a loan they had asked for, and were not able to get any of these loans 
elsewhere; and (2) households that reported they needed credit for which they did not 
apply. 34 Adding to these constrained households (52%) the households that reported they 
would have liked more credit for agricultural production, for their family business or for 
                                                 
33 In the regressions however, we use the variables of credit constraints differenciated by use as defined in 
table 4. 
34 Fifty households expressed a latent credit need for which they did not  apply, but would not have been 
interested in obtaining a loan if credit had been available to them. These households were not  considered 
as credit constrained. Their answer to the question on why they did not  apply was one of the following: 
they disliked borrowing, they had too much debt already, they found work or received remittances from 
their children, the spouse did not consent, or they no longer needed any loan. 
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their non-food expenditures, we reach a total number of 372 credit-constrained 
households, corresponding to 65% of our sample. 
We will concentrate our subsequent analysis on credit constraints for production 
or for non-food expenditures. 
 
4.3. Selected descriptive statistics of the survey households 
Table 8 presents the definitions, means, standard deviations, minimum and 
maximum of the variables used for our estimations of credit constraints and table 9 
presents the means of these variables for the total sample, for agricultural producers, for 
family business owners and for households engaged in both farm and non farm 
production. Households engaged in agricultural or non-agricultural production tend to be 
larger and have an older household head. Smaller households typically young 
households35 who typically start working for somebody else before being able to 
accumulate assets and start a business on their own. Although the Philippine constitution 
provides for universal primary education, only 50% of the households in which all 
members aged 14 and above have at least six years of schooling. In 29% of the 
households, only half or less of the members above 14 years old have at least six years of 
education. 27% of the household heads had 4 years of education or less in our sample. 
There is substantial variation in the area of titled land owned by the farming households 
with 25% of the farming households owning more than 75% of the total titled land area 
of farming households. The Gini coefficient of 0.96 indicates that landownership 
concentration is very high. There are on average more households operating family 
business in barangays where governmental or NGO credit programs operate. These credit 
programs usually support livelihood activities and seem to have been successful in 
expanding off-farm businesses.36 Agricultural producers are on average closer to  a 
commercial or rural bank than non-farm households. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 A test of difference of means for the age of the household head reveals that non-producers households 
have significantly younger heads. 
36 These programs could also target areas where there are more off-farm businesses. 
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Table 8 Description and descriptive statistics, the whole sample 
Variables Description Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
hhsize Size of the household 5.58 2.236 1 20 
ageh Age of the household head in years 44.21 13.629 17 78 
education 
Proportion of household members over 14 
years old with at least six years of 
education 
0.75 0.311 0 1 
tland Area of titled land owned by the household, in hectares 1.24 3.428 0 42.65 
sugarprod Dummy=1 if the area planted to sugar by the household is at least 0.25 hectares  0.3 0.457 0 1 
shock Number of negative shocks experienced by the household between 2001 and 2003 0.43 0.698 0 4 
pshock 
Number of shocks that have made 10% or 
more of the barangay households worse 
off during the years 2001 to 2003 
0.78 1.005 0 3 
creditpg 
Number of NGO or governmental 
programs that provide credit services in 
the barangay 
2.2 1.801 0 8 
dbank Distance to the nearest commercial or rural bank, in kilometers 21.26 32.228 0 100 
 
Table 9 Comparison of means based on productive activity 
  Total sample 
Agricultural 
producer 
households 
Households 
operating a 
family business 
Households 
engaged in 
farming and 
family business  
hhsize 5.58 5.78** 5.91** 6.1** 
ageh 44.21 46.74*** 46.57** 47.76** 
education 0.75 0.75 0.83*** 0.75** 
tland 1.24 1.98*** 1.23 1.87** 
sugarprod 0.3 0.4737 0.37** 0.57*** 
shock 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.4 
pshock 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.77 
creditpg 2.2 2.22 2.55** 2.65** 
dbank 21.26 18.05** 23.74 23.53 
***Difference of means significant38 at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
                                                 
37 Test of difference of means not performed since non-agricultural households cannot be sugar producers.  
38 Difference in the means of farm households compared to non-farm households for example. 
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Table 10 compares the means of variables relevant to the comparison of credit 
constrained and unconstrained households. 
Table 10 Comparison of means based on credit constraint status 
  Total sample 
Agricultural 
production 
credit 
constrained 
households39
Family 
business 
credit 
constrained 
households
Non-food 
consumption 
credit 
constrained 
households 
hhsize 5.58 6.02* 6.6** 5.9** 
ageh 44.21 47.35 48.6* 44.44 
education 0.75 0.71** 0.77* 0.72 
tland 1.24 2** 0.78 0.86* 
sugarprod 0.3 0.56** 0.44 0.34 
shock 0.43 0.58** 0.38 0.58** 
pshock 0.78 0.58** 0.66 0.56** 
creditpg 2.2 1.89** 2.22* 2.01 
dbank 21.26 21.48* 33.27** 25.75** 
sample size/number of  
constrained households 572 358/118 162/50 572/112 
***Difference of means significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% 
level. 
Households constrained in non-farm production and  non-food consumption tend 
to have less titled land. Sugar producers are on average more likely to be credit 
constrained than farm households that do not produce sugar. Positive and negative as well 
as idiosyncratic and covariant shocks are associated with the credit constraint status of 
households. We investigate this further in our regressions, as a significant impact of 
idiosyncratic and covariant shocks would indicate a need for better risk mitigating 
strategies. Producer households are on average less credit constrained when some NGO 
and government credit programs operate in their barangays, but these programs do not 
make a difference for consumption credit constraints. Finally, credit constrained 
households are on average farther from commercial and rural banks than unconstrained 
households. 
 
5. Results of the estimation of production and consumption credit constraints. 
                                                 
39 The test compares the mean of the variables for credit constrained farm household to these of 
unconstrained farm households. 
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The comparisons of means for credit constrained and unconstrained households 
provide interesting information regarding the characteristics of credit constrained 
households, but these descriptive results obviously do not take into account the effect of 
other variables household level unobservables. We address this issue in the regression 
analysis below. 
The results of the two bivariate probits of the probability of being credit 
constrained for agricultural production and consumption and for being credit constrained 
for non-farm business and consumption are presented in table 11. 
A striking result from trivariate probit is the consistent and significant negatif 
impact of education (EDUCATION) on the production credit constraints. We expected 
less- educated households to have a lower demand for external funds but to be more 
subject to credit rationing by the lenders. The results of our estimation indicate that the 
supply side effect is stronger. 
The distance from commercial and rural banks (DBANK) also significantly 
increases the probability of being credit constrained but for agricultural production 
activities only. Similarly, the presence of NGO and governmental credit programs 
(CREDITPG) seems to be successful in reducing credit constraints for agricultural 
production. These two results indicate that some barangays still have poor access to 
formal financial institutions and that access to such institutions would likely increase 
agricultural production and in turn generate growth. The fact that the distance to banks 
and the presence of credit program has no impact on non agricultural production and 
consumption credit constraints might be explained by the minimal provision of credit for 
those purposes by such institutions. Being a sugar producer (SUGARPROD) has a strong 
positive impact on credit constraint status for agricultural production, which indicates that 
sugar planters may be willing to invest more in their plantation but that credit constraints 
impede them from doing so. Producing sugar also significantly increase the probability of 
being credit constrained for off-farm businesses which might indicate that sugar 
producers prioritize the allocation of credit obtained, first to their farming activity, and 
then to their off-farm business. But since they don’t have enough access to credit to reach 
their optimal level of production for their farming activity, they have only little funds 
remaining for their off-farm activity and therefore lack available external funds to reach 
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their optimal level of off-farm production. Another interpretation would be that lenders 
are less willing to lend to sugar producers because of the long repayment cycle.  Sugar is 
an annual crop and if households cannot rely on their family business income to repay the 
loans they incur to finance off-farm business,  then the repayment cycle of the loan has to 
be  one year. Sugar producers also have a higher probability of being constrained on their 
consumption choices. 
As mentioned earlier, supply and demand influence the effect of the area of titled 
land (TLAND) on credit constraints for agriculture production in opposite ways whereas 
only supply should have an effect for off-farm businesses and consumption credit 
constraints. Our results support the theory. The area of titled land significantly reduces 
the probability of being credit constrained for off-farm businesses and consumption 
whereas it has no impact on farm production credit constraint. 
Finally, the experience of idiosyncratic negative shocks (SHOCK) significantly 
increases the probability of being credit constrained for farm activities and consumption 
whereas the experience of collective positive shocks (PSHOCK) significantly reduces the 
probability of being constrained in the three dimensions. This result highlights the need 
for risk mitigating strategies since households cannot completely rely on credit to cope 
with negative shocks, which limit their ability to reach their optimal production level. 
The age of the household head appeard to be a significant factor influencing the 
probability of being constrained for off farm activities with the probability first increasing 
and then decreasing. It isn’t ssurprising that older households have lower credit needs as 
they already have had the time to accumulate assets. It is more surprising that young 
households are less credit constraints than middle age households. The household size 
(HHSIZE) did not have any impact on any credit constraint status.40  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Alternative proxy of household labor such as the number of household members 14 years old and above 
didn’t prove to have a significant impact on credit constraints either.   
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Table 11 Estimation of  credit constraints using a trivariate probit model 
  Credit constraints 
  
Ag 
production
Non-Ag 
production 
Non-food 
expenditures 
hhsize 0.016 0.050 0.030 
 (0.033) (0.053) (0.029) 
ageh -0.037 0.155 0.028 
 (0.038) (0.069)** (0.032) 
agehsq 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)** (0.000) 
education -0.691 -0.801 -0.291 
 (0.242)** (0.455)* (0.200) 
tland 0.004 -0.197 -0.080 
 (0.018) (0.085)** (0.037)** 
sugarprod 0.506 0.646 0.297 
 (0.149)** (0.255)** (0.147)** 
shock 0.314 0.110 0.251 
 (0.098)** (0.184) (0.083)** 
pshock -0.153 -0.186 -0.107 
 (0.072)** (0.102)* (0.062)* 
creditpg -0.070 0.011 0.010 
 (0.038)* (0.054) (0.034) 
dbank 0.006 0.005 0.003 
 (0.002)** (0.003) (0.002) 
cons 0.781 -3.808 -1.467 
 (0.807) (1.649)** (0.677)** 
Nb of obs. 572   
Rho12 0.471 (0.145)**  
Rho13 0.490 (0.080)***  
Rho23 0.468 (0.132)***  
Log likelihood -566.221   
Independance of equations:   
chi² 
(rho12=rho13=rho23=0) 44.163  
Prob>chi²  0.000    
t statistics are given in parentheses. 
* 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Based on direct questions on households’ experiences with credit market we were 
able to estimate the percentage of credit-constrained households at 65%. This estimate 
could even be higher if we consider the households that report they would not use more 
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credit if available to them because interest rates were too high or because they lack the 
appropriate collateral. Credit constraints have differential effects on the household’s 
production and consumption decisions, depending on its credit needs and the availability 
of loan products from financial intermediaries. We found that credit constraints affect the 
scale of production, production technology or input use of 37% of the farming 
households of our sample and of 31% of the households operating a non-agricultural 
business activity.  Since some farm households are also operating a family business, the 
total percentage of households for whom production choices were affected by credit 
constraints is of 39%. This result suggests that better provision of credit to rural 
household might translate in a higher growth level of the rural economy where poverty is 
still pervasive. Credit constraints also affected consumption choices of 21% of our 
sample households. The most frequent reasons for not borrowing more funds are that 
interest rates are too high or that the household is afraid it will not be able to pay back.  
This indicates that access to credit would benefit from a reduction of risk and that the 
development of risk reducing agricultural technologies or credit bureaus would also be 
appropriate in this setting. Our empirical model allows us to identify credit-constrained 
households and which of their production or consumption decisions were affected by 
credit constraints. We found that the presence of credit programs operating in the 
barangay and proximity from commercial banks and rural banks were successful in 
reducing the probability that credit-constraints would affect production decisions. Some 
households are more likely to experience credit-constraints; these are low educated 
households, households that own little or no titled land and the sugar producers. The fact 
that sugar producers are more credit constrained for their production and consumption 
decisions is particularly striking as sugar producing is viewed as a way to escape poverty 
in this area. Further research is needed on the size of the constraints and the impact of 
relaxing credit constraints on production and consumption. As discussed in this paper, it 
would also be helpful to develop studies that would allow to identify households similar 
in their credit needs and compare how credit constraints affect their decisions. This would 
enable us to get more precise information on supply side rationing behavior and on the 
ways to reduce credit constraints. 
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Annex 1 
This annex reproduces the results of the three independent probit models (table 
12) as well as results of the two production probit with sample selection for being 
respectively an agricultural producer and operating a non agricultural business (table 13).  
 
 
Table 12 Estimation of credit constraints using three independent probit models 
  Credit constraints 
  
Ag 
production 
Non-Ag 
production 
Non-food 
expenditures 
hhsize 0.014 0.073 0.029 
 (0.032) (0.054) (0.029) 
ageh -0.035 0.143 0.027 
 (0.039) (0.070)* (0.032) 
agehsq 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)** (0.000) 
education -0.698 -0.668 -0.295 
 (0.247)** (0.482) (0.201) 
tland 0.002 -0.177 -0.074 
 (0.018) (0.084)** (0.037)** 
sugarprod 0.505 0.589 0.277 
 (0.152)** (0.268)** (0.149)* 
shock 0.292 0.006 0.255 
 (0.100)** (0.191) (0.083)** 
pshock -0.150 -0.178 -0.113 
 (0.074)** (0.112) (0.063)* 
creditpg -0.066 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.037)* (0.055) (0.034) 
dbank 0.005 0.006 0.003 
 (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.002) 
cons 0.777 -3.801 -1.425 
  (0.827) (1.665)** (0.677)** 
Nb of obs. 358 162 572 
Log 
Likelihood -218.31 -86.73 -283.26 
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.141 0.045 
t statistics are given in parentheses. 
* 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance 
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Table 13 Estimation of credit constraints using three independent probit models 
  Ag production Non-Ag production 
  
Credit 
constraint 
Selection 
equation 
Credit 
constraint 
Selection 
equation 
hhsize 0.013 -0.054 0.075 0.026 
 (0.032) (0.049) (0.055) (0.028) 
ageh -0.035 0.016 0.145 0.060 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.070)** (0.032)* 
agehsq 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.000) 
education -0.704 -0.187 -0.598 0.817 
 (0.248)** (0.323) (0.579) (0.222)*** 
tland 0.001 17.697 -0.176 -0.072 
 (0.018) (2.168)*** (0.084)** (0.030)** 
sugarprod 0.500  0.601 0.150 
 (0.152)**  (0.271)** (0.143) 
shock 0.290 0.030 -0.008 -0.089 
 (0.100)** (0.155) (0.199) (0.089) 
pshock -0.150 0.015 -0.178 0.061 
 (0.074)** (0.098) (0.112) (0.059) 
creditpg -0.066 -0.040 0.004 0.023 
 (0.037)* (0.062) (0.068) (0.036) 
dbank 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.002 
 (0.002)** (0.003) (0.003)** (0.002) 
farmsize84  0.249   
  (0.067)***   
farmsize84s  -0.120   
  (0.071)*   
nonagrev84    0.000 
    (0.000)*** 
nonagrev84s    0.000 
    (0.000)* 
cons 0.807 -1.996 -4.092 -3.136 
 (0.828) (1.083)* (2.043)** (0.691)*** 
Nb of obs  572  572 
Log Likelihood of separated 
models 324.57  390.190 
Log Likelihood full model 324.32  390.160 
Independance of equations:     
chi²(rho=0)  0.31  0.05 
Prob>chi²   0.478  0.817 
t statistics are given in parentheses. 
* 10% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, *** 1% level of significance 
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As discussed in section 3, they correspond to less preferred empirical strategies 
either because they do not take the correlation in the errors terms into account. However 
it is of interest to notice that our results are robust to other specifications. There is indeed 
little change either in the significance of the impact of the different variables or in the 
sign of the significant variables for these two specifications. The only changes we can 
notice is in the estimation of the non agricultural production credit constraints where in 
both specification, education and collective positive shocks lose their significance 
whereas the distance to the bank significantly increase the probability of being credit 
constrained. 
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